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Cert. to Cal. Ct. App. 
ROONEY (Bookmaker) State/crim. Timely 
1. SUMMARY~ Petr contends. that the Cal • .:;.~.-~j· _e:~e?l~-: ~ ~~:- ~ _.- \;,aV , 
excluding certai_n evidence against him that __ ~~! discc:>~~ : f:.~ ;~-:: -·· __ .>~"' ~0 
. . . " 
pursuant to a warrantless search of a commun~l.trash bin at his 
apartment complex. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: On December 3, 1983, an 
informant told Officer Shorb, of the L.A. police department, that 
resp, Peter Rooney, was conducting a bookmaking operation by 
telephone in which he accepted wagers on professional football 
games. 
·\{~~ 
The informant gave Shorb resp's telephone number, told 
c.- <t..l&_ s QQ...,-""'l 'io l._z_ ""- <; e"' ~. -~ 
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him when resp typically accepted the wagers, but did not specify 
the location where all this took place. Shorb quickly traced the 
telephone number to 1120 No. Flores St., Apt. 8, West Hollywood, 
however, which local utility records listed as being the home of 
~-"Peter Ryan." Shorb then checked p~ arrest record and 
learned that he had been arrested three years earlier for 
conducting bookmaking operations at the same apartment. Shorb 
~~ ~~--~----~ 
also obtained a mug shot of~r. 
On December 15, 1983, Shorb and another officer went to the 
unit apartment complex on Flores St. where p~lived and 
conducted a search through the large, communal trash bin. About 
'------------------------------------~ halfway down, they discovered a brown paper bag with mail 
addressed to ~at the flores St. address, and pieces of paper 
/ with "sports wagers, pays and owes, and a tally sheet of wagers 
on professional football teams." 
On December 26, 1983, the officers placed petr's apartment 
under surveillance. They saw him enter the apartment. ~hey --called the telephone number supplied by the informant and heard 
the informant answer. They then heard the informant ask, "~fuat's 
the latest line," to which an unknown male answered with the 
latest point spreads. ~ 
Based on this information, the officers~ined a warrant 
~ to search ~r's ap~tment to find evidence of his bookmaking 
activities. The record does not contain any details of the 
search that the officers then conducted. 
~~was arrested and indicted on charges of bookmaking. He 
filed a pretrial motion to quash the search warrant and to 
r, 
- 3 -
exclude the evidence obtained from the trash search. ~he ~C 
granted the motion in its entirety, reasoning that there was no 
probable cause to support either the warrantless trash search or 
the subsequent warrant to search the apartment. ~he prosecution 
was unable to proceed, and so the case was dismissed • . , 
The Cal. Ct. App. reversed the TC to the extent it quashed -------the search warrant, holding that the warrant was supported by 
probable cause. But it affirmed the exclusion of the trash 
-__.......... 
search evidence. It reasoned that under the California 
------'--V 
Constitution, persons ~ave a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
trash bins because the property placed in t~em is typically not 
yet abandoned. Under California case law, the validity of a 
trash search is analyzed by the same standard as the validity of 
an automobile search: a warrant is not neede~, but there must be 
~.- ------
probable cause. The court concluded that here there had been no 
probable cause to justify the warrantless trash search. 
The court then noted, however, that under Proposition 8, a 
binding voters' initiative, the state courts may not exclude 
evidence "seized in violation of the California but not the 
federal Constitution." Though recognizing that the circuits have 
uniformly held that trash set aside for collection is abandoned 
property and therefore outside the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment, the court argued that it was not bound to follow 
decisions of the lower federal courts, but only the decisions of 
the California Supreme court or this Court, which has never 
squarely ruled on the issue. 
The Cal. S. Ct. denied review. 
( 
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3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the lower court's 
ruling was based on federal law, and not on an adequate and 
independent state ground. The opinion recognized t~at 
Proposition 8 rendered its exclusionary rule coextensive with 
that of the Federal Constitution, and that "various federal 
courts have held that trash placed in an area where it can be 
collected is abandoned property that is not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment." See, e.g., United States v. Michaels, 726 
F.2d 1307 (CAB 1984); United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789 (CA7 
1983); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299 (CA2 1983); United 
States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (CA3 1981); United States v. 
Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99 (CA5 1979); United States v. Crowell, 586 
F.2d 1020 (CA4 1978); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d lll (CA6 1976); 
United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970 (CAl 1972). ~herefore, 
the state court erred in upholding the exclusion of the trash 
evidence. 
4. DISCUSSION: In stating that it was bound to follow only 
the decisions of this Court, and not those of the federal 
circuits, it is not clear whether the Cal. Ct. App. was 
interpreting its state law obligation under Proposition 8, or 
whether it was making an abstract legal assertion concerning how 
it must determine the content of federal constitutional law. 
Given the court's obvious desire to base its decision on state 
law and thereby insulate itself from the review of this Court, 
the former reading seems reasonable. On the other hand, given 
that the court mentioned the California Supreme Court in the same 





binding authority over it, the latter reading also seems 
reasonahle. The proper resolution of this issue determines 
whether the decision below was based on an adequate and 
independent state ground, or whether it decided a federal 
question in a manner that creates a conflict with virtually every 
circuit to address the issue under the Fourth Amendment. 
In ~igan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), this Court set 
forth a test for determining whether a state court decision rests 
on an adequate and independent state ground or not: 
"[W]hen ••• a state court decision fairl.y appears to 
rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with 
the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence 
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the 
face of the opinion, we will accept as the most 
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the 
case the way it did because it believed that federal 
law required it to do so." Id., at 1040-1041. 
Although this test seems to create a presumption in favor of 
finding the existence of a federal question, the presumption only 
arises if the "decision fairly appears to rest primarily on 
federal law." This is such a close call on the facts of this 
~ 
case that this case would probably involve a refining of the 
Michigan v. Long test in order for the Court to reach the Fourth 
Amendment question. This being the case, summary reversal is 
seems undesirable. 
Nevertheless, I recommend CPR. 
There is no response. 
June 20, 1986 Guynn Opn in ptn 
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To: Just ice Powell March 6, 1987 
~~ ~Cfs ~U}u ~ 
~ ~~ U-<~4~~~ ~v. '4_R!<-f ~ 
From: Bob 
~~~~-~. L-V~ 
No. 85-1835, California v. Rooney ' 
Cert. To Cal. Ct. App. (Lillie, PJ [concurring in judgment], 
Thompson, Johnson, JJ.) 
To be argued Tuesday, March 24, 1987 (3rd case) 
~ ~~ 
-------d . ~~--~ .I' 
c.~ V"L-
Question Presented , ~ -~ 
Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit police officers fr~m ~ 
t.AVCI4 ~ 
making a warr~ination of garbage in the commynal trash ~
bin of a multi-unit apartment? ~~ - · 
2. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In December 1983 a confidential informant told Officer 
Shorb, a Los Angeles police officer, that resp was accepting 
wagers on professional football games over the telephone. 
Officer Shorb determined that the telephone number provided by 
the informant was 1 isted to a "Peter Ryan," at 1120 North Flores 
Street, Apartment 8, West Hollywood. The off ice r further 
determined that resp had been arrested in 1978 for conducting a 
bookmaking operation at the same address. 
at 1120 North Flores Street is a "2-
It comprises in all. 
App. 77. building 
and walked down the driveway to an underground garage. The 
garage was "accessible to the public." Id., at 80-81. The 
garag~tained~out 8 feet long, 4 feet wide, and 
5 feet high, that was shared by all the residents of the 
building. The officers sorted through a full load of trash. In 
the bottom half of the bin they found a shopping bag containing 
mail address~in Apartment 8. The bag contained records 
' . ' 
of sports wagers, "pays and owes," and a tally sheet of wagers on 
~
various professional football teams. The next day Officer Shorb 
observed resp, whom he recognized from a police photograph, enter 
Apartment 8. Later, Officer Shorb telehponed Apartment 8 and 
overheard a telephone conversation between an informant and an 
"unknown mal e." The informant asked, "What's the latest 1 ine?" 
The unknown male responding by giving the latest point spread on 
professional football games. 
3. 
On the basis of this information~ficer Shorb obtained a 
warrant to search resp' s apartment. The record does not reveal 
what additional evidence, if any, was recovered during the 
search. Resp was charged with felonious operation of .a 
bookmaking operation. A~ate magistrate granted resp's motion 
to quash the search warrant. The ~perior Ct. granted resp' s 
motion to suppress evidence obtained from the trash bin and the 
search of resp' s apartment. The L..c:al. Ct. App. agreed that the 
papers taken from the trash bin were inadmissible, but went on to 
hold that the warrant to search resp's apartment was supported by 
probable cause even excluding the information obtained from the 
trash. The~l. Sup. Ct. denied review. 
II. DISCUSSION 
1. Does the Cal. Ct. 
independent state groun ? 
's decision rest on an ade uate and 
Although the briefs do not discuss this issue, the cert. 
/ 
memo suggests that the Cal. Ct. App's decision rests on the 
California Constitution. It is true that the ct. discussed 
~ 
California cases at length, and apparently held that searching 
the trash bin violated the State Constitution. But California 
c:-
has abolished the exlcusionary rule for evidence obtained in 
viol at ion of the State Constitution. Under Cal. Const. art. I, 
§28 (d), the so-called "Truth in Evidence" provision of the 
Victim's Bill of Rights, as interpreted by the Cal. Sup. Ct., the 
California cts will not suppress "'evidence seized in violation 
of the California but not the federal, Constitution.'" Petn app. 
20 (quoting In re Lance, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 879 (1985)). The Cal. 
4. 
Ct. App. recognized this, and went on to state: "While various 
federal courts have held trash placed in an area where it can be 
collected is abandoned property that is not protecte by the 
Fourth Amendment, those decisions are not binding on this court 
since the United States Supreme Court has never squarely ruled on 
the issue." Id., at 20-21. The ct. concluded that the decisions 
upon which it relied "are based on both federal and state -
' 
constit~tional provi~ions ••• that this court must follow until 
either the California or the United States Supreme Court rules on 
the issue." Id., at 21-22 {emphasis added). The ct. proceeded 
to discuss Abel v. United States, 362 u.s. 217 {1960~, at some 
length, and to distinguish it on its facts. It thus seems clear .J ., 
{to me, at least), that the Cal. Ct. App. would have reached the 
opposite result if it had concluded that no federal right of 
resp's had been violated. Under Michigan v. Long, 463 u.s. 1032 
{1983), the state ct's decision appears to rest primarily on 
federal law, or to be "interwoven" with federal law, and the .-------. 
adequacy and independence of any possible state ground is not 
clear on the face of the opinion. I therefore conclude that the 
Court has jurisdiction. 
2. The Merits. I do not think this is a particularly hard 
case for you. The Cal. Ct. App.'s decision is contrary to "the 
overwhelming weight of authority." United States v. 0' Bryant, 
775 F.2d 1528, 1533 {CAll 1985); United States v. Thornton, 746 
F. 2 d 3 9 , 4 9 an d n • 11 { CADC 19 8 4 ) • In spite of the contorted 
arguments in petr's brief {which must be one of the worst merits 
5. 
briefs the Court has received this year), the question for 
decision i simply whether the officers violated a 
"constitutional y protected reasonable expectation of privacy" of 
resp's. See California v. Ciraolo, 106 s.ct. 1809, 1811 (1986). 
I think they did not. 
Resp placed a bag of papers in a large open trash bin in an ----
area accessible to the public. It is true that "what [a person] ----seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United 
States, 389 u.s. 347, 351-352 (1967). But the expectation of 
privacy must be a reasonable one. Here, resp knew that the trash 
would be handled by sanitation workers. If a sanitation worker 
had noticed the incriminating evidence and turned it over to the 
police, I do not see how resp could have complained. Moreover, 
it is a fact of life that private citizens often go through trash 
containers looking for aluminum cans or other items of value. 
(In New Haven, while I was at law school, it was very common for 
"street peo:ele" to go through the dumpsters located in and around 
Yale buildings to find clothing, food, or anything they could 
sell. No doubt Hollywood is more affluent than New Haven, but I 
have the impressionm this is a common occurrence in the United 
States.) In this case, there was no local ordinance foEbidding 
citizens from looking through trash. Even if there had been such --an ordinance, it probably would not have created a reasonable 
expectation that it would be obeyed.) 
In my view, this is enough to dispose of resp's contention 
that he enjoyed a general expectation of privacy in his garbage. 
6. 
Resp's next argument is that, even if he could not reasonably 
expect complete privacy, he at least had a reasonable expectation 
that police officers would not examine the trash for the purpose 
of discovering evidence of crime. But the distinction between 
police officers and "other persons" is unpersuasive. First, as a 
general rule, 
responsibilities 
pol ice carrying out their 1 aw enforcement 
should not be more restricted in their 
activities than members of the public. See v eal ifornia v. 
Ciraolo, 106 S.Ct. 180 9' 1813 ( 1986) (aerial observation by 
offercer trained to recognize marijuana is "precisely what a~ 
judicial off ice r needs to provide a basis for a warrant.") 
Second, if the confidential informant had gone through the trash 
himself, without being prompted by the police, the evidence would 
have been admissible. I see no significant difference between 
this and an examination by police officers. (Of course the 
evidence is likely to support a finding of probable cause, and be 
more damaging to a defendant at trial, if it is found by a police 
officer than by an informant.) 
Even r esp concedes that pol ice officers may search a city 
--------------------~---
dump_tor ~crime. It would be absurd to require the 
police to obtain a warrant before searching public property for, 
say, a discarded weapon. I see no basis for distinguishing trash ~ 
at the city dump from trash in a communal trash bin located in an 
area accessible to the general public. As the amicus brief filed 
on behalf of California and other states observes, there is a 
Catch-22 quality to resp's argument that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his garbage until it had lost its 
7. 
identity by being mixed with other garbage. Resp seems to 
suggest that, if the garbage can be traced to him and used as 
evidence, it must be suppressed. Tha t is, th e pol ice are 
permitted to examine resp's garbage only if it cannot be used as 
evidence against him! On the other hand, a person probably does 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage kept within 
the curtilage of a private home, as several lower cts have held. 
E.g., Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483-484 (CAS 1974). In 
those cases, however, the Fourth Amendment applies because of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in all items within the 
curtilage, not because of any reasonable expectation of privacy 
in garbage. In this case, resp apparently does not contend that 
a communal trash bin in a garage open to the public is within the 
curtilage, and it seems clear that it is not. 
The Court might rest its decision on the conclusion that 
resp "abandoned" his papers by placing them in the trash bin. He 
gave up control over them and, as a practical matter, made them 
v-
accessible to anyone who cared to dig them out. In Abel v. 
United States, 3 62 u.s. 217 ( 196 0) , the Court held that the 
infamous Soviet spy Colonel Rudolph Abel had abandoned items the ----------
FBI seized from a waste;eaper basket in Abel's hotel room after --Abel checked out. On balance, however, I would not rest the 
decision on "abandonment." The California cts have found that a 
person does not give up all his rights in personal property by~_ 
placing them in the trash. In particular, the cts have held that ~ 
7 individuals have a right to expect that their garbage will be 
handled only by garbage collectors. People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 
8. 
357 (1971). Of course abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes 
need not depend on state law. But by deciding the case on the 
general ground that resp had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the Court can give minimal weight to California law. 
I also see no reason for the Court to consider resp' s 
suggestion that the "automobile except ion" of United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 u.s. 1 (1977), should apply to garbage. It may be 
that a warrantless search is justified upon probable cause 
because garbage is likely to be moved or commingled with other 
garbage in the time it takes to get a warrant. But the two 
situations are so different that the analogy does not seem 
particularly helpful, and it is unnecessary to the decision of 
the case. 
Finally, there is nothing to resp's contention that a 
decision in petr' s favor should not be applied to him. Resp 
suggests that he relied on state law for the proposition that he 
had a right of privacy in his garbage under the California 
Constitution, but apparently disclaims any knowledge of 
"Proposition 8," the well-known Cal if or nia constitutional 
amendment abolishing the exclusionary rule except where it is 
required by federal law. Moreover, the overwhelming weight of 
' 
federal authority was against him. Resp should not be allowed to 
rely on such a selective ignorance of the law. 
Aside on Petr's Brief. Petr' s brief, which apparently was -
written by senior attorneys in the office of the District 
Attorney for Los Angeles, ~ (To start with, my copy is 
bound with electrician's tape--and all the pages except p. 1 are 
~ 
9. 
upside down!) Petr argues at length that the papers in the trash 
bin were not resp's papers in the constitutional sense. To the 
extent this makes any sense at all, it is just a roundabout way 
of saying that r esp had abandoned the papers. Petr also makes 
the mystifying statement that "[c]andor compels us to concede 
that in some intellectually respectable sense of the term, 
'reasonable expectation of privacy' can be so used that indeed a 
prudent, law-abiding person may arguably be said to have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to garbage placed 
in a communal trash bin when he intends and desires, and 
reasonably anticipates, that police will not examine the contents 
-... 
J/ 
of the trash container." Brief for Petr 64-65. Petr goes on to 
argue that "reasonable expectation of privacy" should not be 
/ 
defined as what a reasonable 1 ayperson would expect--that is, 
that lsome reasonable expectations of privacy are unreasonable in 
the eyes of the 1 aw. Perhaps petr is thinking of ~ 
Justice Harlan's remark that the Fourth Amendment protects only I 
that society is prepared to 
This is silly. 
those expectations of privacy 
recognize as reasonable. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As a practical matter, a decision in favor of the State is 
unlikely to result in a significant invasion of privacy. First, 
as CA2 has noted, "once the trash is discarded the former owner ---rarely has any further interest in it other than to be assured 
that it will not remain at his doorstep. In the rare instance 
when he desires to preclude inspection by others of private 
papers in his garbage he may do so by first shredding or burning 
10. 
them or by hand-delivering the papers to a garbage-grinding 
machine." United States v. <erry, 702 F.2d 299, 309 (CA2 1983), 
cert. denied, 461 u.s. 931. These elementary precautions are 
well known and widely practiced when a person truly wishes to 
keep a paper private. ~ given the difficult and unpleasant 
nature of the task, it is unlikely that the police will engage in 
extensive searches of garbage. Indeed, resp' s argument derives 
whatever plausibility it has from the improbability that the 
pol ice would decide to wade through mounds of possibly foul-
smelling refuse. But the fact that police rarely resort toJ uch 
unpleasant investigative methods does not imply that they will 
not resort to them in the rare case in which it is worthwhile to 
examine particular garbage to determine whether evidence can be 
discovered and linked to a particular suspect. 
I recommend that you vote to reverse the judgment of the ~ 
Cal. Ct. App. 
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From: Justice White 
MA'1 4 1987 Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1835 
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. PETER ROONEY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[May -, 1987] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The police obtained information that one Pete:r Ryan was 
accepting wagers on professional football games at 1120 
North Flores Street, Apartment 8, West Hollywood, Cali-
fornia. Two officers went to 1120 North Flores, a 28-unit 
apartment building with a subterranean garage which was 
accessible to the public, entered the garage, and searched the 
communal trash bin. In the bottom half of the bin they dis-
covered a brown paper shopping bag which contained mail 
addressed to respondent at 1120 North Flores Street, Apart-
ment 8, and papers bearing bookmaking notations. The po-
lice seized the bag. They used these items and the results of 
further investigation to support a search warrant of respond-
ent's apartment, which was duly executed. 
Rooney was charged with bookmaking and associated 
crimes. He moved to have the warrant quashed and the evi-
dence obtained from the search of the trash bin excluded. 
The trial court granted his motion, the State declared that it 
could not proceed, and the case was dismissed. The State's 
appeal followed. The California Court of Appeal held that 
the State had failed to prove that Rooney had abandoned his 
property by putting it into the tras~ bin. Because the ga-
rage was accessible to the public, however, and the officers 
did not commit a trespass by entering the garage, the court 
also rejected Rooney's claim that the search of the bin was 
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ment. In so ruling, the Court of Appeal relied on a holding 
of the California Supreme Court to this effect. People v. 
Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 152, 390 P. 2d 381 (1964). The court 
went on to hold that under the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of California, the Fourth Amendment did not require a 
warrant for a trash bin search but did require probable cause, 
which the court found lacking here. 1 The search of the trash 
bin therefore violated the Fourth Amendment and the evi-
dence seized from the bin was not admissible. The subse-
quent warrant, however, was itself valid, since it was 
supported by probable cause wholly aside from the trash-bin 
evidence. It is the former holding that the State challenged 
in its petition for certiorari after the California Supreme 
Court denied review. We granted the petition, -- U. S. 
-- (1986), and for the reasons that follow, we reverse. 
We note at the outset that we have no reason to differ with 
the state court that the trash bin was not within the curtilage 
of Rooney's apartment, that the garage was open to the 
public and that the officers committed no trespass and were 
not invading any private zone when they approached the 
trash bin. The question is whether the search of the trash 
bin and the seizure of some of its contents were unreasonable 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, which pro-
tects the right of the people to be secure "in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures." 
1 The court observed that the "Truth in Evidence" provision of the Vic-
tim's Bill of Rights (Proposition 8) abrogated a defendant's right to object 
to and to suppress evidence seized in violation of the California but not of 
the Federal Constitution. The Court of Appeal noted, however, that the 
California Supreme Court had held that under both the California and Fed-
eral Constitutions, a trash can outside the curtilage of a house could be 
searched without a warrant, but not without probable cause. People v. 
Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P. 2d 1262 (1971), remanded, 409 U. S. 33 
(1972), on remand, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457, cert. denied, 412 U. S. 919 
(1973). 
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The State submits that once Rooney placed the seized 
items in the trash bin, he abandoned them and lost any pos-
sessory or ownership interest in them that he may have had. 
Hence, they were no longer his papers or effects and were 
not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 2 The Court of 
Appeal rejected this submission; and for ~ent pur_p9ses, 
we assume that under state law Rooney retained an owner-
ship or posessory 1 eres in tne ras ag an its contents. 
Rooney s property in teres , however, does not settle the 
matter for Fourth Amendment purposes, for the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment is not determined by state property law. 
As we have said; the premise that property interests control 
the right of officials to search and seize has been discredited. 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 183 (1984); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U. S. 294, 304 (1967). The primary object of the Fourth 
Amendment is to p~otect priYe,cy, not property, and the 
question in this case:-;s the Court of Appeal recognized, is 
not whether Rooney had abandoned his interest in the prop-
erty law sense, but whether he retained a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy in his trash bag that society accepts 
as objectively reasonable. O'Connor v. Ortega, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1987); California v. Ciraolo, -- U.S. --, 
-- (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S., at 177; Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). We there-
fore proceed to that inquiry. 
2 The State emphasizes that the Fourth Amendment protects the "right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." 
It points to Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 176-177 (1984), as an 
illustration of the plain language approach to the Fourth Amendment. In 
Oliver, we based our holding that the Fourth Amendment does not extend 
to an open field on the explicit language of the amendment. We held that 
an open field is neither a "house" nor an "effect." See also id., at 184 
(WHITE, J., concurring). 
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We acknowledge at the outset that trash can reveal a great 
deal about the life of its disposer. 3 As respondent elo-
quently phrases it, the domestic garbage can contains numer-
ous "tell-tale items on the road map of life in the previous 
week." Brief for Respondent 15. A hope of privacy is not 
equivalent to an expectation of privacy, however. Respond-
ent vigorously argues that he exhibited an expectation of pri-
vacy by taking the affirmative step of placing his bag of trash 
in the bottom half of the dumpster. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38, 
43-44, 55-56. This argument is somewhat difficult to accept. 
Nothing in the record demonstrates that respondent actually 
buried his trash in the bin as opposed to simply throwing it in 
when the bin was nearly empty. In any event, assuming 
that respondent did have a subjective expectation of privacy, 
"steps taken to protect privacy [do not] establish that expec-
tations of privacy ... are legitimate." Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U. S., at 182. "Rather, theCoiTect inquiry 
is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the 
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." ld., at 182-183. A person may well intend not 
to relinquish all rights in personal property but neverthe-
less take action rendering this intent ineffective for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. 
The State points out that the communal trash bin in which 
respondent placed his refuse was accessible to other tenants 
3 The Garbage Project of the University of Arizona, directed by ar-
chaeologists at the University, was founded upon the advice of archaeology 
pioneer Emil Haury: "If you want to know what is really going on in a com-
munity, look ~t its garbage." W. Rathje, "Archaeological Ethnography 
... Because Sometimes It is Better to Give than to Receive," in R. Gould 
(eel.), Explorations in Ethnoarchaeology 49, 54 (1978). In that project, 
Tucson Sanitation Division Personnel randomly selected refuse set out for 
collection by households throughout the city. Procedures ensured ano-
nymity. The archaeologists sorted the refuse from each household into 
more than 150 categories in order to improve their understanding of con-
temporary society (as well as to refine techniques for understanding the 
material culture of earlier societies). 
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in the apartment building and their guests, to the owner and 
manager of the building, and to the public at large. It is 
common knowledge that trash bins and cans are commonly 
visited by animals, children, and scavengers looking for valu-
able items, such as recyclable cans and "Bottles, and service-
able clothing and household furnishings. Accordingly, Cali-
fornia argues, any expectation of privacy respondent may 
have had in the contents of the trash bin was unreasonable. 
Respondent argues in response that the probability that 
garbage collectors or the police will search the contents of a 
particular trash bin is extremely small, and that this minute 
probability, in and of itself, makes his expectation of privacy 
in the trash bin reasonable. According to respondent, the 
reality of domestic garbage collection is that the collectors 
move quickly from bin to bin, do not have time to look for 
valuable items, and probably would not recognize evidence of 
criminal activity. Garbage is promptly intermingled with 
other garbage in a truck such that its origin can no longer be 
identified. It is then "hauled to the dump, where it will 
be burned/destroyed/plowed under by Caterpillar tractors, to 
form the foundation for new housing developments." Brief 
for Respondent 16. Similarly, respondent asserts that there 
clearly are too few policemen in Los Angeles to conduct 
random searches of trash cans for evidence of crime. Re-
spondent further argues that one may have a "differential 
expectation of privacy" with respect to animals, children, 
and scavengers and with respect to the police. I d., at 18; 
see Smith v. Alaska, 510 P. 2d 793, 803 (1973) (Rabinowitz, 
C. J., dissenting). While it may not be totally unforeseeable 
that trash collectors or other third persons may occasionally 
rummage through one's trash, it may be quite unexpected 
that the police will conduct a systematic inspection for evi-
dence of criminal activity. In any event, respondent s.tates 
that the Fourth Amendment protects against the acts of the 
government, not private citizens. 
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We are unpersuaded. "What a person knowingly exposes 
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S., at 351-352 (citations omitted). Respondent 
knowingly exposed his betting papers to the public by depos-
iting them in a trash bin which was accessible to the public. 
Once they were in the bin, he no longer exercised control 
over them. While he may not have welcomed intrusions, 
respondent did nothing to ensure that his refuse would not be 
discovered and appropriated. Indeed, he placed his papers 
in the bin for the express purpose of conveying them to third 
parties, the trash collectors, whom he had no reasonable 
expectation would not cooperate with the police. In Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979), we held that the installa-
tion, at the request of the police, of a pen register at the 
telephone company's offices to record the telephone numbers 
dialed on the petitioner's telephone did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. The petitioner had no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the telephone numbers since he voluntarily con-
veyed them to the telephone company when he used his tele-
phone. "This Court consistently has held that a person has 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he volun-
tarily turns over to third parties." I d., at 7 43-7 44. 
Respondent's reliance on the fact that the police do not 
ordinarily engage in random searches, or comprehensive city-
wide searches, of trash cans is misplaced. A police depart-
ment, like-any organization with limited resources, allocates 
its resources to activities most likely to result in the detection 
or prevention of crime. The police in this case searched the 
trash bin after receiving a tip from an informant that a book-
making operation was being conducted at the apartment 
house. It is not unforeseeable that police will investigate 
when they have information suggesting that an investigation 
will be useful. In Smith v. Maryland, for example, a Balti-
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more woman was robbed and thereafter received threatening 
and obscene phone calls from a man identifying himself as the 
robber. When their investigation led the police to suspect 
that the petitioner was the perpetrator, they had the pen 
register installed and recorded a call from the petitioner's 
home to the victim. The petitioner would have been entirely 
justified in believing that the police would not likely have dis-
covered his telephone call to the victim by means of a random 
search of telephone numbers dialed in the city, and that the 
police would not likely have undertaken a systematic search 
of all telephone calls made in the city. That fact, however, 
did not give petitioner a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the telephone numbers he dialed. In California v. Ciraolo, 
-- U. S. --, --, n. 2 (1986), we expressly rejected tfie 
California Court of Appeal's position that a search, which it 
would have found permissible if conducted pursuant to a rou-
tine police patrol, violated the Fourth Amendment because 
information of illegality had led the police to focus on a par-
ticular place. We held in that case that the observation of a 
fenced backyard by police officers trained in marijuana iden-
tification from a private plane at an altitude of 1,000 feet did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment because the defendant 
had no legitimate expectation that his property would not be 
so observed: 
"The observations of Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in 
this case took place within public navigable airspace . . . 
in a physically nonintrusive manner; from this point they 
were able to observe plants readily discernable to the 
naked eye as marijuana. That the observation from the 
aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the of-
ficers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. 
Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer 
needs to provide a basis for a warrant. Any member of 
the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could 
have seen everything that these officers observed. On 
this record, we readily conclude that respondent's expec-
8 
85-1835-0PINION 
CALIFORNIA v. ROONEY 
tation that his garden was protected from such observa-
tion is unreasonable and is not an expectation that soci-
ety is prepared to honor." !d., at--. 
Any distinction between the examination of trash by trash 
collectors and scavengers on the one hand and the police on 
the other is untenable. If property is exposed to the general 
~ic, it is ex osed in e ual measure to the pol~ce. is 
clear from Ciraolo t at the Fourth Amendment does not re-
quire the police to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal 
activity that any member of the public could have observed, 
even if a casual observer would not likely have realized that 
the object indicated criminal activity or would not likely 
have notified the police even if he or she had realized the ob-
ject's significance. It may of course be true that a person 
minds an examination by the police more than an examination 
by an animal, a child, a neighbor, a scavenger, or a trash col-
lector, but that does not render the intrusion by the police 
illegitimate. 
The Court of Appeal noted the existence of municipal ordi-
nances which prohibit persons other than authorized collec-
tors from rummaging through the trash of another. Such or-
dinances, however, do not change the fact that the owner of 
the trash completely re1inquishes control over the trash to a 
third party, the designated trash collector, who for all the 
owner knows, will cooperate with the ·police. Cf. Lewis v. 
United States, 385 U. S. 206 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 
385 U. S. 293 (1966). Moreover, it is not at all clear that 
such a municipal ordinance would evoke an expectation of pri-
vacy in trash. Respondent did not rely on any such ordi-
nance here and it has been noted that the purpose of such 
ordinances is sanitation and economic protection of the 
authorized trash collector rather than privacy. See United 
States v. Vahalik, 606 F. 2d 99, 100-101 (CA5 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U. S. 1081 (1980); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 
357, 368, n. 1, 486 P. 2d 1262 (1971) (Wright, C. J., concur-
ring and dissenting), remanded 409 U. S. 33 (1972), on re-
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mand, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457, Cert. denied, 412 U. S. 
919 (1973). 
Every federal Court of Appeals that has addressed the 
issue as cone u e a e ourth Amendment does not 
protect trash placed for collection outside a residence and its 
curtilage. United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F. 2d 1432, 
1437 (CA9 1986); United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F. 2d 1528 
(CAll 1985); United States v. Michaels, 726 F. 2d 1307, 
1312-1313 (CAS), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 820 (1984); United 
States v. Kramer, 711 F. 2d 789 (CA7), cert. denied, 464 
U. S. 962 (1983); United States v. Terry, 702 F. 2d 299, 
308-309 (CA2), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 931 (1983); United 
States v. Reicherter, 647 F. 2d 397, 399 (CA3 1981); United 
States v. Vahalik, supra; United States v. Crowell, 586 F. 2d 
1020, 1025 (CA4 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 959 (1979); 
Magda v. Benson, 536 F. 2d 111, 112-113 (CA6 1976); United 
States v. Mustone, 469 F. 2d 970, 972 (CAl 1972). The 
Courts of Appeals had little difficulty reaching this con-
clusion. As the Third Circuit stated in United States v. 
R eicherter: 
"Defendant claims that . . . he had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the trash he placed in a public area to 
be picked up by trash collectors . . . . A mere recitation 
of the contention carries with it its own refutation. . . . 
Having placed the trash in an area particularly suited 
for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, pub-
lic consumption, for the express purpose of having 
strangers take it, it is inconceivable that the defendant 
intended to retain a privacy interest in the discarded 
objects. If he had such an expectation, it was not rea-
sonable." 647 F. 2d, at 399. 
This unanimity of opinion among the federal appellate courts 
supports our determination that society is not prepared to 
accept as reasonable an expectation of privacy in trash depos-
ited in an area accessible to the public pending collection by a 
municipal authority or its authorized agent. 
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The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed 
and this case is remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1835 
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. PETER ROONEY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[June-, 1987] 
PER CURIAM. 
We granted the State's petition for certiorari to decide 
whether respondent retained an expectation of privacy in a 
bag that he placed in the communal trash bin of a multi-unit 
apartment building. After briefing and oral argument on 
that issue, it has now become clear that the question is not 
properly presented in this case. 
I 
Based upon an informant's tip that respondent was accept-
ing wagers on professional football games at a specified tele-
phone number, police began an investigation which eventu-
ally led to an application for a search warrant for 1120 North 
Flores Street, Apartment No. 8, West Hollywood, Califor-
nia. In conjunction with the application, a police officer sub-
mitted an affidavit including at least five details in support of 
the warrant: 1) that the informant had -named Rooney and 
had correctly specified when Rooney would be at the apart-
ment; 2) that the telephone number and utilities were listed 
to one Peter Ryan, and that use of a pseudonym is common 
among bookmakers; 3) that Rooney had previously been ar-
rested for bookmaking at the apartment; 4) that through a 
search of the communal trash bin in the apartment building's 
basement the police had retrieved a bag containing mail ad-
dressed to Rooney at apartment No. 8, and containing evi-
dence of gambling activity; and 5) that the police had dialed 
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the telephone number the informant had given them and had 
overheard a conversation involving point spreads on profes-
sional football games. See App. 19-28. The magistrate 
found probable cause for a search of Apartment 8, and issued 
a warrant. Incriminating evidence was found during the 
search and respondent was arrested. 
After he was charged with a number of felony offenses, re-
spondent brought a motion to quash the search warrant and 
to dismiss the felony charges against him. He argued that 
there was no probable cause to support the warrant because 
the earlier warrantless search of the communal trash bin had 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights under a number of 
California Supreme Court precedents, and that, without the 
incriminating evidence found in the trash, there was in-
sufficient evidence to support the warrant. A magistrate 
granted respondent's motion, agreeing that the evidence ob-
tained from the trash bin could not be used to support the 
search warrant for the apartment, and ruling that the other 
evidence offered in support of the search warrant was in-
sufficient to establish probable cause. The Superior Court 
reached the same conclusion. Pursuant to California proce-
dural rules, the State then informed the court that it could 
not prosecute the case without the evidence seized in the 
search of the apartment, and the case was dismissed, thus 
allowing the State to appeal the order quashing the warrant. 
The Court of Appeal reversed on the only issue before it-
to use the State's words, "the sufficiency of the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant." 1 Although it concluded 
'Appellant's Opening Brief in the Ct. App. Cal. 2d App. Dist., 
No. B006936, p. 2. 
Throughout the proceedings it was clear that the courts were passing 
only upon Rooney's motion to quash the search warrant and suppress the 
evidence found in the apartment; there was no motion to suppress the evi-
dence found in the trash. For example, the first thing the magistrate said 
after calling Rooney's case was: "This is before the Court on the notice of 
motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Penal Code Section 
1538.5." Clerk's Transcript 3. After hearing argument involving the dif-
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that the evidence found in the trash bin could not be used to 
support the search warrant, the Court of Appeal examined 
the other evidence offered in support of the warrant under 
the standards set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462. U. S. 213 
(1983), and held that there was sufficient other evidence to 
establish probable cause in support of the warrant. The Su-
perior Court's order dismissing the case was therefore re-
versed, allowing the prosecution to proceed. The California 
Supreme Court denied both petitioner's and respondent's 
petitions for review. The State then sought review in this 
Court, arguing that the California courts had erred in stating 
that the search of the trash was unconstitutional. We 
granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1986). 
II 
This Court "reviews judgments, not statements in opin-
ions." Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297 
(1956); see also Chevron, U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council , Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984); Williams v. 
Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, 120 (1827). Here, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal was entirely in the State's favor-the 
search warrant which was the sole focus of the litigation was 
deemed valid. The fact that the Court of Appeal reached its 
decision through analysis different than this Court might 
have used does not make it appropriate for this Court to re-
write the California court's decision, or for the prevailing 
party to request us to review it. That the Court of Appeal 
ferent parts of the affidavit supporting the search warrant, the magistrate 
announced: "It is going to be the ruling of this Court that although this is a 
relatively close matter, but I feel that the notice of motion to quash the 
search warrant pursuant to Penal Code Section 1538.5 should be granted." 
!d., at 21. 
Again, when the case came before the Superior Court, the first thing the 
judge stated was: "The matter pending, motion to suppress evidence pur-
suant to Section 1538.5. At this point, to classify the issue, is directed at 
the sufficiency of the search warrant and challenges the affidavit on its 
face ." App. 51. 
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even addressed the trash bin issue is mere fortuity; it could 
as easily have held that since there was sufficient evidence to 
support the search even without the trash evidence, it would 
not discuss the constitutionality of the trash search. The 
Court of Appeal's use of analysis that may have been adverse 
to the State's long-term interests does not allow the State to 
claim status as a losing party for purposes of this Court's . 
review. 2 
But, the State argues, ijthe case does come to trial, and if 
the State does wish to introduce the evidence, it will be 
barred from doing so because the reasoning in the Court of 
Appeal's decision will constitute the law of the case. There 
are two too many "ifs" in that proposition to make our review 
appropriate at this stage. Even if everything the prosecu-
tion fears comes to bear, the State will still have the opportu-
nity to appeal such an order,a and this Court will have the 
2 The Deputy District Attorney arguing the case before this Court can-
didly described the State's reasons for seeking certiorari in this case: 
"Q. So that everything you found under the search warrant is 
admissible. 
"Mr. Guminski: That is correct, Your Honor. But the ruling ... is a 
ruling that forecloses the use of what was discovered as far as the trash 
bag; that would be the rule of the case. 
"Q. And you think you're really going to use that at this trial, or you 
think that you would really need to? 
"A. Well, Your Honor, I think what we really want would be to ... 
overrule People v. Krivda, which was here before the Court in 1972, and 
which was remanded then because there were independent state grounds. 
"I mean, I wish to answer candidly to your question, Justice; there is an 
intention to use it, of course. 
"But is it is a vehicle of review." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-27. 
3 Assuming that respondent's motion to suppress the trash evidence will 
be granted, the prosecution will then have to decide whether it can prose-
cute without the evidence. If it cannot, then an order of dismissal will be 
entered, and the prosecution may immediately appeal. See Cal. Penal 
Code Ann. §§ 1238, 1538.5 (West 1982). Even if the prosecution can pro-
ceed without the evidence, however, it may still obtain immediate review 
through a writ of mandate or prohibition. § 1538.5(o). A writ of mandate 
could compel the superior court to admit the evidence and "must be issued 
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chance to review it, with the knowledge that we are review-
ing a state court judgment on the issue, and that the State 
Supreme Court has passed upon or declined review in a case 
squarely presenting the issue. As it stands, we have no way 
of knowing what the California Supreme Court's position on 
the issue of trash searches currently is. 4 It is no answer to 
say that the California Supreme Court already had its chance 
to review the matter and declined to do so when it denied the 
State's petition for review in this case. The denial of review 
may well have been based on that court's recognizing, as we 
now do, that the prosecution won below, and was therefore 
not in a position to appeal. Giving the California Supreme 
where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary 
course of law." Cal. Civ. Proc. Ann. Code § 1086 (West 1982). A writ of 
prohibition deals with jurisdictional defects and would not appear to be rel-
evant here. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1102 (West 1982). See gen-
erally B. Witkin, California Criminal Procedure §§ 869, 870 (1985 Supp., 
pt. 2). 
'The California rule regarding trash searches is derived from the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P. 
2d 1262 (1971) (en bane). We granted certiorari to review that decision 
but we were unable to determine whether the California Supreme Court 
had rested its decision on state or federal grounds. 409 U. S. 33 (1972). 
On remand, the court announced that it had rested on both state and fed-
eral constitutional grounds, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457 (1973), cert. de-
nied, 412 U. S. 919 (1973), which prevented us from reviewing the case. 
In 1985, however, the people of California amended their constitution to 
bar the suppression of evidence seized in violation of the California, but not 
the Federal, Constitution. Cal. Const., Art. I, § 28(d); see generally In re 
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P. 2d 744 (1985). Thus, the Court of Appeal 
was forced to rest its discussion of the trash-search issue in this case on the 
Federal Constitution. 
While we express no view on the merits of the issue, we note that the 
arguments that the State now makes rely, in large part, on post-Krivda 
developments, including the State constitutional amendment discussed 
above, this Court's intervening decisions, and decisions of the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals dealing with trash searches. The California Supreme 
Court should be afforded the opportunity to consider these factors before 
we intervene. 
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Court an opportunity to consider the issue in a case that 
properly raises it is a compelling reason for us to dismiss this 
petition. 5 Under these circumstances, our review of the 
trash search issue, which has never been the subject of an ac-
tual judgment, would be most premature. 
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently 
granted. 
5 Moreover, because of the unusual posture of the case, we cannot know 
whether the prosecution will even seek to introduce the trash evidence at 
trial. If the evidence found in the apartment pursuant to the valid war-
rant is strong enough, the prosecution might not even be interested in pre-
senting the more attenuated evidence found in the trash. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1835 
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. PETER ROONEY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[June-, 1987] 
JUSTICE WHITE , dissenting. 
The police obtained information that respondent, using a 
specified telephone number, was accepting wagers on profes-
sional football games. It was learned from the telephone 
company that the telephone number was listed to one Peter 
Ryan at 1120 North Flores Street, Apartment 8, West Holly-
wood, California. Two officers went to 1120 North Flores 
Street, a 28-unit apartment building with a subterranean 
garage which was accessible to the public, entered the ga-
rage, and searched the communal trash bin. In the bottom 
half of the bin they discovered a brown paper shopping bag 
which contained mail addressed to respondent at 1120 North 
Flores Street, Apartment 8, and papers bearing bookmaking 
notations. The police seized the bag. They used these 
items and the results of further investigation to support a 
search warrant of respondent's apartment, which was duly 
executed. 
Rooney was charged with bookmaking and associated 
crimes. He moved to have the warrant quashed and the evi-
dence obtained from the search of the trash bin excluded. 
The trial court granted his motion, the State declared that it 
could not proceed, and the case was dismissed. The State's 
appeal followed. The California Court of Appeal held that 
the State had failed to prove that Rooney had abandoned his 
property by putting it into the trash bin. Because the ga-
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did not commit a trespass by entering the garage, the court 
also rejected Rooney's claim that the search of the bin was 
illegal because it occurred within the curtilage of his apart-
ment. In so ruling, the Court of Appeal relied on a holding 
of the California Supreme Court to this effect. People v. 
Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 152, 390 P. 2d 381, 391 (1964). The 
court went on to hold that under the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of California, the Fourth Amendment did not require 
a warrant for a trash-bin search but did require probable 
cause, which the court found lacking here. 1 The search of 
the trash bin therefore violated the Fourth Amendment and 
the evidence seized from the bin was not admissible. The 
subsequent warrant, however, was itself valid, since it was 
supported by probable cause wholly aside from the trash-bin 
evidence. It is the former holding that the State challenged 
in its petition for certiorari after the California Supreme 
Court denied review. I would reverse. 
I 
We granted certiorari to consider whether the search of 
the communal trash bin violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court now holds that the issue is not properly before us 
and dismisses the writ. Because this judgment is plainly in-
firm, I dissent. 
Rooney first moved to quash the search warrant in the 
Municipal Court on the ground that the evidence taken ·from 
the trash bin had been illegally seized and could not be used 
'The court observed that the "Truth in Evidence" provision of the 
Victim's Bill of Rights (Proposition 8) abrogated a defendant's right to 
object to and to suppress evidence seized in violation of the California but 
not of the Federal Constitution. 175 Cal. App. 3d 634, 644, 221 Cal. Rptr. 
49, 55 (1985). The Court of Appeal noted, however, that the California 
Supreme Court had held that under both the California and Federal Con-
stitutions, a trash can outside the curtilage of a house could be searched 
without a warrant, but not without probable cause. People v. Krivda, 5 
Cal. 3d 357, 486 P. 2d 1262 (1971), remanded, 409 U. S. 33 (1972), on re-
mand, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457, cert. denied, 412 U. S. 919 (1973). 
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to furnish probable cause for the warrant. The magistrate 
agreed that the trash-bin search was illegal and that aside 
from the items taken from the bin, the search warrant affida-
vit failed to reveal probable cause for the issuance of the war-
rant. The case was dismissed when the State indicated it 
could not proceed. 
The State, claiming that the ruling had been erroneous, 
moved in the Superior Court to reinstate the charges. The 
motion was granted and a trial date was set. Rooney then 
filed a motion "to suppress as evidence all tangible or intangi-
ble things seized, including but not limited to observations 
and conversations." App. 40-41. There were two grounds 
for the motion: first, that the State had obtained the address 
of the apartment without a warrant and that this alleged vi-
olation tainted the fruits of all subsequent investigations; sec-
ond, that the search of the trash bin was illegal. App. 43-45. 
Most of the hearing on the motion centered on the search of 
the trash bin, the court concluding that the items seized from 
the bin could not be used to furnish probable cause for the 
warrant. App. 69-70. The case was again dismissed on the 
State's representation that it could not proceed. 
The record to this point plainly reveals that the motion to 
suppress filed in the Superior Court literally covered the 
items seized from the trash bin. Moreover, quashing the 
warrant was based on the ruling that the search of the bin 
was illegal and that the items seized could not be used to 
support the warrant. It makes no sense to characterize this 
ruling as anything but a suppression of the items seized: they 
could not be used as evidence to support the warrant and ob-
viously could not be used as evidence at trial. 
The State appealed, arguing that the ruling on the trash 
bin was erroneous and that the warrant was valid. The 
Court now suggests that the Court of Appeal had before it 
only the admissibility at trial of the evidence seized from the 
apartment pursuant to the warrant. But the warrant could 
have been sustained either because the trash-bin search was 
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legal and the items seized from the bin therefore admissible 
or because the other evidence was itself sufficient. The 
Court of Appeal expressly said that both issues were before 
it: 
"The People bring this appeal (Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. 
(a)(7)) from the order dismissing the case against defend-
ant who was charged with bookmaking (§ 337a). The 
dismissal was entered after the prosecution represented 
that it could not proceed due to the granting of defend-
ant's motion to quash a search warrant and suppress evi-
dence (§ 1538.5). The first issue before us is whether the 
warrantless search of the defendant's apartment build-
ing's trash bin constituted an unreasonable search and 
seizure. We conclude that it did for lack of probable 
cause. The second issue is whether a police officer's 
affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of the 
search warrant authorizing the search of defendant's 
apartment. We conclude that even excluding the items 
seized from the trash bin, the tip from the informant 
coupled with other corroborating evidence were suffi-
cient to support the warrant. We therefore reverse and 
remand." 175 Cal. App. 3d 634, 638-639, 221 Cal. Rptr. 
49, 51-52 (1985) (emphasis added). 
The State argued only the legality of the search of the bin, 
and the Court of Appeal addressed that issue first, devoting 
most of its opinion to the question, which it surely would not 
have done if the issue were irrelevant to its disposition of the 
case. Had the Court of Appeal upheld the trash-bin search, 
it would have reversed the Superior Court. The Court of 
Appeal dealt with the adequacy of the other evidence only 
after holding that the items seized from the bin could not be 
used as evidence to support the warrant. That ruling effec-
tively made that evidence unavailable to the State. 
Both parties filed petitions for rehearing, Rooney arguing 
that the issue of the adequacy of the evidence aside from the 
items seized from the bin was not properly before the court 
85-1835--DISSENT 
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and that the issue had been improperly decided. The State 
reargued the legality of the search of the bin but also asked in 
any event that the court strike the portion of its opinion deal-
ing with the the items seized from the trash, since that ruling 
foreclosed using that evidence at trial. Both petitions were 
denied. 
Both sides then filed petitions for review in the California 
Supreme Court, the State arguing that it had erroneously 
been denied the use at trial of the evidence found in the trash 
bin. Both petitions for review were denied. The State then 
sought a stay of the Court of Appeal's judgment pending cer-
tiorari here. Its argument was that it was entitled to the 
stay in order to permit it to seek review of the judgment that 
the trash bin items were not admissible at trial. The Court 
of Appeal granted the stay and we in turn granted certiorari. 
There is no jurisdictional obstacle to deciding the issue on 
which we granted certiorari. The highest court of the State 
in which review could be had decided that question against 
the State, clearly holding that the trash-bin evidence must be 
suppressed. It then stayed the effect of that ruling. We 
granted certiorari, the case was briefed and orally argued, 
and Rooney never suggested that the issue of the trash-bin 
search is not properly before us. We have repeatedly held 
pretrial orders suppressing evidence to be final judgments 
within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3). See New York 
v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); California v. 
Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966), decided with 
Miranda v. Arizona; see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U. ~· 
287 (1984); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978); Colorado 
v. Bannister, 449 U. S. 1 (1980). 
The Court now dismisses the case, but I suggest that its 
action is based on a careless and inadequate reading of the 
record and that it should have more regard for the time and 
effort that will be wasted by its belated order. Because in 
my view the legality of the search of the communal trash can 
is properly here, I shall address it. 
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II 
I note at the outset that I have no reason to differ with the 
state court that the trash bin was not within the curtilage of 
Rooney's apartment, that the garage was open to the public, 
and that the officers committed no trespass and were not in-
vading any private zone when they approached the trash bin. 
The question is whether the search of the trash bin and the 
seizure of some of its contents were unreasonable within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, which protects the 
right of the people to be secure "in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." 
The State submits that once Rooney placed the seized 
items in the trash bin, he abandoned them and lost any pos-
sessory or ownership interest in them that he may have had. 
Hence, they were no longer his papers or effects and were 
not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 2 The Court of 
Appeal rejected this submission and for present purposes, I 
assume that under state law Rooney retained an ownership 
or possessory .interest in the trash bag and its contents. 
Rooney's property interest, however, does not settle the 
matter for Fourth Amendment purposes, for the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment is not determined by state property law. 
As we have said, the premise that property interests control 
. the right of officials to search and seize has been discredited. 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 183 (1984); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U. S. 294, 304 (1967). The primary object of the Fourth 
2 The State emphasizes that the Fourth Amendment protects the "right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers , and effects." 
Brief for Petitioner 2. It points to Oliver v. United States , 466 U. S. 170, 
176-177 (1984), as an illustration of the plain language approach to the 
Fourth Amendment. In Oliver, we based our holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not extend to an open field on the explicit language of the 
amendment. We held that an open field is neither a "house" nor an "ef-
fect. " See also id. , at 184 (WHITE, J ., concurring). 
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Amendment is to protect privacy, not property, and the 
question in this case, as the Court of Appeal recognized, is 
not whether Rooney had abandoned his interest in the prop-
erty law sense, but whether he retained a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy in his trash bag that society accepts 
as objectively reasonable. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 
--,-- (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.--,--
(1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S., at 177; Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). I therefore pro-
ceed to that inquiry. 
I acknowledge at the outset that trash can reveal a great 
deal about the life of its disposer. 3 As respondent elo-
quently phrases it, the domestic garbage can contains numer-
ous "tell-tale items on the road map of life in the previous 
week." Brief for Respondent 15. A hope of privacy is not 
equivalent to an expectation of privacy, however. Respond-
ent vigorously argues that he exhibited an expectation of pri-
vacy by taking the affirmative step of placing his bag of trash 
in the bottom half of the dumpster. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38, 
43-44, 55-56. This argument is somewhat difficult to accept. 
Nothing in the record demonstrates that respondent actually 
buried his trash in the bin as opposed to simply throwing it in 
when the bin was nearly empty. In any event, assuming 
that respondent did have a subjective expectation of privacy, 
3 The Garbage Project of the University of Arizona, directed by ar-
chaeologists at the University, was founded upon the advice of archaeology 
pioneer Emil Haury: "If you want to know what is really going on in a cofn-
munity, look at its garbage." W. Rathje, "Archaeological Ethnography 
... Because Sometimes It is Better to Give than to Receive," in Explora-
tions in Ethnoarchaeology 49, 54 (R. Gould ed. 1978). In that project, 
Tucson Sanitation Division personnel randomly selected refuse set out for 
collection by households throughout the city. Procedures ensured ano-
nymity. The archaeologists sorted the refuse from each household into 
more than 150 categories in order to improve their understanding of con-
temporary society (as well as to refine techniques for understanding the 
material culture of earlier societies). 
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"steps taken to protect privacy [do not] establish that expec-
tations of privacy ... are legitimate." Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U. S., at 182. "Rather, the correct inquiry 
is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the 
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." !d., at 182-183. A person may well intend not 
to relinquish all rights in personal property but neverthe-
less take action rendering this intent ineffective for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. 
The State points out that the communal trash bin in which 
respondent placed his refuse was accessible to other tenants 
in the apartment building and their guests, to the owner and 
manager of the building, and to the public at large. It is 
common knowledge that trash bins and cans are commonly 
visited by animals, children, and scavengers looking for valu-
able items, such as recyclable cans and bottles, and service-
able clothing and household furnishings. Accordingly, Cali-
fornia argues, any expectation of privacy respondent may 
have had in the contents of the trash bin was unreasonable. 
Respondent argues in response that the probability that 
garbage collectors or the police will search the contents of a 
particular trash bin is extremely small, and that this minute 
probability, in and of itself, makes his expectation of privacy 
in the trash bin reasonable. According to respondent, the 
reality of domestic garbage collection is that the collectors 
move quickly from bin to bin, do not have time to look for 
valuable items, and probably would not recognize evidence of 
criminal activity. Garbage is promptly intermingled with 
other garbage in a truck such that its origin can no longer be 
identified. It is then "hauled to the dump, where it will 
be burned/destroyed/plowed under by Caterpillar tractors, to 
form the foundation for new housing developments." Brief 
for Respondent 16. Similarly, respondent asserts that there 
clearly are too few policemen in Los Angeles to conduct 
random searches of trash cans for evidence of crime. Re-
spondent further argues that one may have a "differential 
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expectation of privacy" with respect to animals, children, 
and scavengers and with respect to the police. I d., at 18; 
see Smith v. Alaska, 510 P. 2d 793, 803 (1973) (Rabinowitz, 
C. J., dissenting). While it may not be totally unforeseeable 
that trash collectors or other third persons may occasionally 
rummage through one's trash, it may be quite unexpected 
that the police will conduct a systematic inspection for evi-
dence of criminal activity. In any event, respondent states 
that the Fourth Amendment protects against the acts of the 
government, not private citizens. 
I am unpersuaded. "What a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks 
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the pub-
lic, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S., at 351-352 (citations omitted). Respond-
ent knowingly exposed his· betting papers to the public by 
depositing them in a trash bin which was accessible to the 
public. Once they were in the bin, he no longer exercised 
control over them. While he may not have welcomed intru-
sions, respondent did nothing to ensure that his refuse would 
not be discovered and appropriated. Indeed, he placed his 
papers in the bin for the express purpose of conveying them 
to third parties, the trash collectors, whom he had no reason-
able expectation would not cooperate with the police. In 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979), we held that the 
installation, at the request of the police, of a pen register 
at the telephone company's offices to record the telephone 
numbers dialed on the petitioner's telephone did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers since he 
voluntarily conveyed them to the telephone company when 
he used his telephone. "This Court consistently has held 
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in in-
formation he voluntarily turns over to third parties." I d., at 
743-744. 
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Respondent's reliance on the fact that the police do not 
ordinarily engage in random searches, or comprehensive city-
wide searches, of trash cans is misplaced. A police depart-
ment, like any organization with limited resources, allocates 
its resources to activities most likely to result in the detection 
or prevention of crime. The police in this case searched the 
trash bin after receiving a tip from an informant that a 
bookmaking operation was being conducted at the apartment 
house. It is not unforeseeable that police will investigate 
when they have information suggesting that an investigation 
will be useful. In Smith v. Maryland, for example, a Balti-
more woman was robbed and thereafter received threatening 
and obscene phone calls from a man identifying himself as the 
robber. When their investigation led the police to suspect 
that the petitioner was the perpetrator, they had the pen 
register installed and recorded a call from the petitioner's 
home to the victim. The petitioner would have been entirely 
justified in believing that the police would not likely have dis-
covered his telephone call to the victim by means of a random 
search of telephone numbers dialed in the city, and that the 
police would not likely have undertaken a systematic search 
of all telephone calls made in the city. That fact, however, 
did not give petitioner a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the telephone numbers he dialed. In California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U. S., at--, n. 2, we expressly rejected the California 
Court of Appeal's position that a search, which it would have 
found permissible if conducted pursuant to a routine police 
patrol, violated the Fourth Amendment because information 
of illegality had led the police to focus on a particular place. 
We held in that case that the observation of a fenced back-
yard by police officers trained in marijuana identification 
from a private plane at an altitude of 1,000 feet did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment because the defendant had no legiti-
mate expectation that his property would not be so observed: 
"The observations of Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in 
this case took place within public navigable airspace ... 
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in a physically nonintrusive manner; from this point they 
were able to observe plants readily discernible to the 
naked eye as marijuana. That the observation from the 
aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the of-
ficers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. 
Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer 
needs to provide a basis for a warrant. Any member of 
the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could 
have seen everything that these officers observed. On 
this record, we readily conclude that respondent's expec-
tation that his garden was protected from such observa-
tion is unreasonable and is not an expectation that soci-
ety is prepared to honor." !d., at--. 
Any distinction between the examination of trash by trash 
collectors and scavengers on the one hand and the police on 
. the other is untenable. If property is exposed to the general 
public, it is exposed in equal measure to the police. It is 
clear from Ciraolo that the Fourth Amendment does not re-
quire the police to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal 
activity that any member of the public could have observed, 
even if a casual observer would not likely have realized that 
the object indicated criminal activity or would not likely 
have notified the police even if he or she had realized the ob-
ject's significance. It may of course be true that a person 
minds an examination by the police more than an examination 
by an animal, a child, a neighbor, a scavenger, or a trash col-
lector, but that does not render the intrusion by the police 
illegitimate. 
The Court of Appeal noted the existence of municipal ordi-
nances which prohibit persons other than authorized collec-
tors from rummaging through the trash of another. Such or-
dinances, however, do not change the fact that the owner of 
the trash completely relinquishes control over the trash to a 
third party, the designated trash collector, who for all the 
owner knows, will cooperate with the police. Cf. Lewis v. 
United States, 385 U. S. 206 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 
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385 U. S. 293 (1966). Moreover, it is not at all clear that 
such a municipal ordinance would evoke an expectation of pri-
vacy in trash. Respondent did not rely on any such ordi-
nance here and it has been noted that the purpose of such 
ordinances is sanitation and economic protection of the 
authorized trash collector rather than privacy. See United 
States v. Vahalik, 606 F. 2d 99, 100-101 (CA5 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U. S. 1081 (1980); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 
357, 368, n. 1, 486 P. 2d 1262, 1264, n. 1 (1971) (Wright, 
C. J., concurring and dissenting), remanded 409 U. S. 33 
(1972), on remand, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457, cert. denied, 
412 u. s. 919 (1973). 
Every Federal Court of Appeals that has addressed the 
issue has concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect trash placed for collection outside a residence and its 
curtilage. United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F. 2d 1432, 
1437 (CA9 1986); United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F. 2d 1528 
(CAll 1985); United States v. Michaels, 726 F. 2d 1307, 
1312-1313 (CA8), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 820 (1984); United 
States v. Kramer, 711 F. 2d 789 (CA7), cert. denied, 464 
U. S. 962 (1983); United States v. Terry, 702 F. 2d 299, 
308-309 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom Williams v. United 
States, 461 U. S. 931 (1983); United States v. Reicherter, 647 
F. 2d 397, 399 (CA3 1981); United States v. Vahalik, supra; 
United States v. Crowell, 586 F. 2d 1020, 1025 (CA4 1978), 
cert. denied, 440 U. S. 959 (1979); Magda v. Benson, 536 F. 
2d 111, 112-113 (CA6 1976); United States v. Mustone, 469 
F. 2d 970, 972 (CA11972). The Courts of Appeals had little 
difficulty reaching this conclusion. As the Third CircUit 
stated in United States v. Reicherter: 
"Defendant claims that . . . he had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the trash he placed in a public area to 
be picked up by trash collectors . . . . A mere recitation 
of the contention carries with it its own refutation. 
Having placed the trash in an area particularly suited 
for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, pub-
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lie consumption, for the express purpose of having 
strangers take it, it is inconceivable that the defendant 
intended to retain a privacy interest in the discarded 
objects. If he had such an expectation, it was not rea-
sonable." 647 F. 2d, at 399. 
This unanimity of opinion among the federal appellate courts 
supports the determination that society is not prepared to 
accept as reasonable an expectation of privacy in trash depos-
ited in an area accessible to the public pending collection by a 
municipal authority or its authorized agent. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1835 
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. PETER ROONEY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[June-, 1987] 
PER CURIAM. 
We granted the State's petition for certiorari to decide 
whether respondent retained an expectation of privacy in a 
bag that he placed in the communal trash bin of a multi-unit 
apartment building. After briefing and oral argument on 
that issue, it has now become clear that the question is not 
properly presented in this case. 
I 
Based upon an informant's tip that respondent was accept-
ing wagers on professional football games at a specified tele-
phone number, police began an investigation which eventu-
ally led to an application for a search warrant for 1120 North 
Flores Street, Apartment No. 8, West Hollywood, Califor-
nia. In conjunction with the application, a police officer sub-
mitted an affidavit including at least five details in support of 
the warrant: 1) that the informant had named Rooney and 
had correctly specified when Rooney would be at the apart-
ment; 2) that the telephone number and utilities were listed 
to one Peter Ryan, and that use of a pseudonym is common 
among bookmakers; 3) that Rooney had previously been ar-
rested for bookmaking at the apartment; 4) that through a 
search of the communal trash bin in the apartment building's 
basement the police had retrieved a bag containing mail ad-
dressed to Rooney at apartment 8, and containing evidence of 
gambling activity; and 5) that the police had dialed the tele-
..tUN 1 1 l9ij/ 
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phone number the informant had given them and had over-
heard a conversation involving point spreads on professional 
football games. See App. 19-28. The Magistrate found 
probable cause for a search of Apartment 8, and issued a war-
rant. Incriminating evidence was found during the search 
and respondent was arrested. 
After he was charged with a number of felony offenses, re-
spondent brought a motion to quash the search warrant and 
to dismiss the felony charges against him. He argued that 
there was no probable cause to support the warrant because 
the earlier warrantless search of the communal trash bin had 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights under a number of 
California Supreme Court precedents, and that, without the 
incriminating evidence found in the trash, there was in-
sufficient evidence to support the warrant. A magistrate 
granted respondent's motion, agreeing that the evidence ob-
tained from the trash bin could not be used to support the 
search warrant for the apartment, and ruling that the other 
evidence offered in support of the search warrant was in-
sufficient to establish probable cause. The Superior Court 
reached the same conclusion. Pursuant to California proce-
dural rules, the State then informed the court that it could 
not prosecute the case without the evidence seized in the 
search of the apartment, and the case was dismissed, thus 
allowing the State to appeal the order quashing the warrant. 
The Court of Appeal reversed on the only issue before it-
to use the State's words, "the sufficiency of the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant." 1 Although it concluded 
1 Opening Brief for Appellant in No. B006936, Cal. 2nd App. Dist. 
Throughout the proceedings it was clear that the courts were passing 
only upon Rooney's motion to quash the search warrant and suppress the 
evidence found in the apartment; there was no motion to suppress the evi-
dence found in the trash. For example, the first thing the Magistrate said 
after calling Rooney's case was: "This is before the Court on the notice of 
motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Penal Code Section 
1538.5." Clerk's Transcript 2-3. After hearing argument involving the 
different parts of the affidavit supporting the search warrant, the Magis-
85-1835---PER CURIAM 
CALIFORNIA v. ROONEY 3 
that the evidence found in the trash bin could not be used to 
support the search warrant, the Court of Appeal examined 
the other evidence offered in support of the warrant under 
the standards set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 
(1983), and held that there was sufficient other evidence to 
establish probable cause in support of the warrant. The Su-
perior Court's order dismissing the case was therefore re-
versed, allowing the prosecution to proceed. The California 
Supreme Court denied both petitioner's and respondent's 
petitions for review. The State then sought review in this 
Court, arguing that the California courts had erred in stating 
that the search of the trash was unconstitutional. We 
granted certiorari. 479 U. S. -- (1986). 
II 
This Court "reviews judgments, not statements in opin-
ions." Black v. CutteT LaboratoTies, 351 U. S. 292, 297 
(1956); see also ChevTon , U. S . A . Inc . v. Natuml R esow·ces 
Defense Council , Inc. , 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984); Williarns v. 
Non·is, 12 Wheat. 117, 120 (1827). Here , the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal was entirely in the State's favor-the 
search warrant which was the sole focus of the litigation was 
deemed valid. The fact that the Court of Appeal reached its 
decision through analysis different than this Court might 
have used does not make it appropriate for this Court to re-
·write the California court's decision, or for the prevailing 
party to request us to review it. That the Court of Appeal 
even addressed the trash bin issue is mere fortuity; it could 
trate announced: "It is going to be the ruling of this Court that although 
this is a relatively close matter, but I feel that the notice of motion to quash 
the search warrant pursuant to Penal Code Section 1538.5 should be 
granted." ld. , at 21. 
Again, when the case came before the Superior Court, the first thing the 
judge stated was: "The matter pending, motion to suppress evidence pur-
suant to Section 1538.5. At this point , to classify the issue, is directed at 
the sufficiency of the search warrant and challenges the affidavit on its 
face." App. 50. 
85-1835---PER CURIAM 
4 CALIFORNIA v. ROONEY 
as easily have held that since there was sufficient evidence to 
support the search even without the trash evidence, it would 
not discuss the constitutionality of the trash search. The 
Court of Appeal's use of analysis that may have been adverse 
to the State's long-term interests does not allow the State to 
claim status as a losing party for purposes of this Court's 
review. 2 
2 A -'reful and adequate reading of the record,~. post, at 5 (JUSTICE 
WHITE's dissenting opinion). reveals that the State itself has neYer be-
lieved that the Court of Appeal's judgment incorporated any motion to sup-
press thE:: evidence found in the trash. For example, as JUSTICE WHITE 
notes, the State sought rehearing in the Court of Appeal, but as part of 
that petition it stated that the Court of Appeal's "opinion should be appro-
priately modified to delete its discussion of the issue since its determination 
that the search warrant was based upon probable cause was made notwith-
standing its conclusion that the Krivda rule applies to communal trash 
bins.'' Petition for Rehearing or Modification of Order 4. If the Court of 
Appeal had actually issued a judgment on the issue, the State would haYe 
sought a modification of the judgment-not a mere modification of the 
opinion. That the State does not belieYe that the Court of Appeal issued a 
judgment excluding the eYidence from the trash search is further corrobo-
rated by the State's own arguments before this Court. In its petition for 
certiorari, the State explained: 
"At first blush, it might be urged that a petition for certiorari should not 
be granted because the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the search of the 
apartment building communal trash bin was unreasonable constitutes obi-
te?· dicta. However, the Court of Appeal's determination that the search 
of the trash bin was unreasonable cannot be deemed to merely constitute 
obiter dicta. Unless overturned ou this point, the Court of Appeal's con-
clusion constitutes the la~r of the case. Hence at the trial, the People 
would be precluded from introducing eYidence as to what the police officer:; 
had found in the trash bin." Pet. for Cert. 14-15 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the Deputy District Attorney arguing the case before this 
Court candidly described the State's reasons for seeking certiorari in this 
case: 
"Q. So that everything you found under the search warrant is 
admissible. 
"Mr. Guminski: That is correct, Your Honor. But the ruling ... is a 
ruling that forecloses the use of what was discovered as far as the trash 
bag; that would be the rule of the case. 
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But, the State argues, ijthe case does come to trial, and if 
the State does wish to introduce the evidence, it will be 
barred from doing so because the reasoning in the Court of 
Appeal's decision will constitute the law of the case. There 
are two too many "ifs" in that proposition to make our review 
appropriate at this stage. Even if everything the prosecu-
tion fears comes to bear, the State will still have the opportu-
nity to appeal such an order,8 and this Court will have the 
chance to review it, with the knowledge that we are review-
ing a state court judgment on the issue, and that the State 
Supreme Court has passed upon or declined review in a case 
squarely presenting the issue. As it stands, we have no way 
"Q. And you think you're really going to use that at this trial, or you 
think that you would really need to? 
"A. Well, Your Honor, I think what we really want would be to ... 
overrule People v. Krivda, which was here before this Court in 1972, and 
which was remanded then because there were independent state grounds. 
"I mean, I wish to answer candidly to your question, Justice; there is an 
intention to use it, of course. 
"But it is a vehicle of review." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-27. 
Of course , as we explain, see infra,-----, the law of the case doc-
trine provides no justification for our granting review at this stage. See 
Barclay v. Florida , 463 U. S. 939, 946 (1983); Hathorn v. Lovor"'l , 457 
U. S. 255, 261-262 (1982); see generally R. Stern, E. Gressman, & S. Sha-
piro , Supreme Court Practice 132 (6th ed. 1986). 
3 Assuming that respondent's motion to suppress the trash evidence will 
be granted, the prosecution will then have to decide whether it can prose-
cute without the evidence. If it cannot. then an order of dismissal will be 
entered , and the prosecution may immediately appeal. See Cal. Penal 
Code Ann. §§ 1238, 1538.5 (West 1982). Even if the prosecution can pro-
ceed without the evidence, however, it may still obtain immediate review 
through a writ of mandate or prohibition. § 1538.5(o). A writ of mandate 
could compel the superior court to admit the evidence and "must be issued 
where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary 
course of law." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1086 (West 1982). A writ of 
prohibition deals with jurisdictional defects and would not 9.ppear to be 
relevant here . See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1102 (West 1982). See 
generally B. Witkin, California Criminal Procedure §§ 869, 870 (1985 
Supp., pt. 2). 
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of knowing what the California Supreme Court's position on 
the issue of trash searches currently is. 4 It is no answer to 
say that the California Supreme Court already had its chance 
to review the matter and declined to do so when it denied the 
State's petition for review in this case. The denial of review 
may well have been based on that court's recognizing, as we 
now do, that the prosecution won below, and was therefore 
not in a position to appeal. Giving the California Supreme 
Court an opportunity to consider the issue in a case that 
properly raises it is a compelling reason for us to dismiss this 
petition. 5 Under these circumstances, our review of the 
trash-search issue, which has never been the subject of an 
actual judgment, would be most premature. 
• The California rule regarding trash searches is derived from the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in People v. Krivda , 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P. 
2d 1262 (1971) (en bane). We granted certiorari to review that decision 
but we were unable to determine whether the California Supreme Court 
had rested its decision on state or federal grounds. 409 U. S. 33 (1972). 
On remand , the court announced that it had rested on both state and fed-
eral constitutional grounds, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457 (1973), cert. de-
nied , 412 U. S. 919 (1973) , which prevented us from reviev.ing the case. 
In 1985, however, the people of California amended their Constitution to 
bar the suppression of evidence seized in violation of the California , but not 
the Federal , Constitution. Cal. Const. , Art. I , § 28(d); see generally In re 
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P. 2d 744 (1985). Thus, the Court of Appeal 
was forced to rest its discussion of the trash-search issue in this case on the 
Federal Constitution. 
While we express no view on the merits of the issue, we note that the 
arguments that the State now makes rely, in large part , on post-Kn'vda 
developments, including the State constitutional amendment discussed 
above, this Court's intervening decisions , and decisions of the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals dealing with trash searches. The California Supreme 
Court should be afforded the opportunity to consider these factors before 
we intervene. 
' Moreover, because of the unusual posture of the case, we cannot know 
whether the prosecution will even seek to introduce the trash evidence at 
trial. If the evidence found in the apartment pursuant to the valid war-
rant is strong enough, the prosecution might not even be interested in 
presenting the more attenuated evidence found in the trash. 
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The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently 
granted. 
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